My 10-Week HTB Sherlocks Blue Team Roadmap
A practical 10-week HTB Sherlocks roadmap for SOC, DFIR, Blue Team, Purple Team, malware triage, cloud IR, threat intel, and interview prep.
Roadmap
This is my current HTB Sherlocks roadmap for building a practical SOC / Blue Team foundation.
The point is not to collect solves. The point is to get better at reading evidence, building timelines, explaining attacker actions, and writing notes that can survive an interview.
For every Sherlock, I write a short case summary, initial access, affected host/user, first suspicious timestamp, evidence, attacker actions, IoCs, MITRE ATT&CK mapping, containment, one detection idea, and a 90-second interview answer.
Week 1 - Core Investigation Foundation
| Lab | Area | Level | Practice |
|---|---|---|---|
| Brutus | DFIR | Very Easy | Linux auth.log, wtmp, SSH brute force, successful login, persistence, sudo activity. |
| Unit42 | DFIR | Very Easy | Sysmon Event IDs, process tree, DNS queries, network connection, timestomping. |
| BFT | DFIR | Very Easy | $MFT, MFTECmd, Timeline Explorer, Zone.Identifier, malicious file recovery. |
| Telly | SOC | Very Easy | Basic SOC alert triage and case handling. |
Week 2 - PCAP, AD Intro, Malware, Threat Intel
| Lab | Area | Level | Practice |
|---|---|---|---|
| Meerkat | SOC | Easy | PCAP, Suricata alerts, credential stuffing, CVE exploitation, web app compromise. |
| Campfire-1 | DFIR | Very Easy | Kerberoasting detection, Event ID 4769, Rubeus, PowerView, AD log analysis. |
| Subatomic | Malware Analysis | Medium | Electron malware, fake installer, Discord hijacking, browser data theft, static triage. |
| ElectricBreeze-1 | Threat Intelligence | Very Easy | Threat intel pivoting, campaign context, external indicator enrichment. |
Week 3 - Windows Logs, AD Network Attack, Web Compromise, Cloud
| Lab | Area | Level | Practice |
|---|---|---|---|
| LogJammer | DFIR | Easy | Windows Security, System, Defender, Firewall, PowerShell logs, scheduled tasks. |
| Noxious | SOC | Very Easy | LLMNR poisoning, rogue device detection, AD network recon. |
| Bumblebee | DFIR | Easy | phpBB SQLite database, web logs, web shell and admin compromise analysis. |
| Nubilum-1 | Cloud | Medium | AWS CloudTrail, compromised EC2, exposed S3, cloud IR, PoshC2. |
Week 4 - AS-REP, Fake CAPTCHA, PE Triage, Insider Timeline
| Lab | Area | Level | Practice |
|---|---|---|---|
| Campfire-2 | DFIR | Very Easy | AS-REP roasting, Event ID 4768, vulnerable AD account detection. |
| Pikaptcha | DFIR | Easy | Fake CAPTCHA, PowerShell Run dialog abuse, registry artifacts, PCAP correlation. |
| Heartbreaker-Continuum | Malware Analysis | Easy | PEStudio, Ghidra, VirusTotal, MITRE ATT&CK mapping. |
| Constellation | Threat Intelligence | Medium | Insider threat, URL forensics, Discord and Google timeline reconstruction. |
Week 5 - NTLM Relay, Endpoint Artifacts, Malware, GCP Cloud
| Lab | Area | Level | Practice |
|---|---|---|---|
| Reaper | DFIR | Very Easy | NTLM relay, LLMNR response poisoning, Windows Security Log correlation. |
| Noted | DFIR | Easy | Notepad++ artifacts, AppData, data extortion trail. |
| SalineBreeze-2 | Malware Analysis | Easy | Malware triage, IoC extraction, breach investigation. |
| MisCloud | Cloud | Medium | GCP breach, Gitea vulnerability, cloud misconfiguration. |
Week 6 - AD Credential Theft, SOC Case, Malware Medium, Email Forensics
| Lab | Area | Level | Practice |
|---|---|---|---|
| CrownJewel-1 | DFIR | Very Easy | NTDS.dit dump, Volume Shadow Copy, AD enumeration. |
| Cuidado | SOC | Easy | SOC alert investigation and correlation. |
| SneakyKeys | Malware Analysis | Medium | Medium malware triage, keylogging and persistence-style reasoning. |
| TickTock | DFIR | Medium | Spear-phishing investigation, email forensics, timeline reconstruction. |
Week 7 - Lateral Movement, Exfiltration, Memory, Cloud Follow-up
| Lab | Area | Level | Practice |
|---|---|---|---|
| CrownJewel-2 | DFIR | Very Easy | Lateral movement detection, Pass-the-Hash. |
| Litter | SOC | Easy | Network forensics, data exfiltration indicators. |
| Recollection | DFIR | Easy | Memory forensics, Volatility, suspicious process analysis. |
| Nubilum2 | Cloud | Easy | Cloud follow-up investigation, identity and resource reasoning. |
Week 8 - Threat Hunting, Active TI, Malware Module, Cloud Campaign
| Lab | Area | Level | Practice |
|---|---|---|---|
| Tracer | DFIR | Easy | PsExec detection, SOC alert investigation, lateral movement. |
| KitsuneHook | Threat Intelligence | Easy | Active threat intel practice, newer challenge, less writeup dependency. |
| Malevolent ModMaker | Malware Analysis | Medium | Custom malware module analysis. |
| OpTinselTrace24-3: Blizzard Breakdown | Cloud | Medium | Cloud investigation in a campaign-style case. |
Week 9 - APT, Memory/Event Correlation, Hard Network, Hard Malware
| Lab | Area | Level | Practice |
|---|---|---|---|
| APTNightmare | DFIR | Medium | APT-style investigation, multi-stage incident reconstruction. |
| OpTinselTrace-3 | DFIR | Medium | Volatility3, Chainsaw, memory plus event log correlation. |
| ProcNet | DFIR | Hard | Network traffic analysis, malware investigation, API data capture. |
| Lockpick3.0 | Malware Analysis | Hard | Hard ransomware and malware continuation after Lockpick2.0. |
Week 10 - Final Capstone
| Lab | Area | Level | Practice |
|---|---|---|---|
| OpTinselTrace-4 | DFIR | Easy | Data exfiltration, C2 communication analysis. |
| OpTinselTrace-5 | DFIR | Hard | Full APT chain reconstruction and final reporting. |
| Lockpick4.0 | Malware Analysis | Insane | Ransomware/malware capstone, deeper encryption and key recovery reasoning. |
| LogForge | DFIR | Medium | Blind final exam style practice: log correlation without leaning on public writeups. |
Reading Layer
| Priority | Topic | Read with | Link |
|---|---|---|---|
| Must | C2 communication detection | Meerkat, Litter, ProcNet, OpTinselTrace-4, APTNightmare | HTB |
| Must | LLMNR poisoning detection | Noxious, Reaper, Campfire-1, Campfire-2 | HTB |
| Must | SmartScreen logs for execution evidence | Pikaptcha, Noted, LogJammer | HTB |
| Must | PsExec lateral movement artifacts | Tracer, CrownJewel-2, APTNightmare | HTB |
| Must | AWS CloudTrail log analysis | Nubilum-1, Nubilum2, MisCloud, OpTinselTrace24-3 | HTB |
| Strong | Windows event logs for incident responders | Unit42, LogJammer, Campfire-1, Campfire-2, Reaper | HTB |
| Strong | Incident response report template | All labs, especially Week 4 onward | HTB |
| Strong | Network traffic analysis | Meerkat, Litter, Noxious, Reaper, ProcNet | HTB |
| Strong | Volatility and memory forensics | Recollection, OpTinselTrace-3, APTNightmare | HTB |
| Strong | Anti-forensics techniques | BFT, Unit42, Noted, APTNightmare, OpTinselTrace | HTB |
Optional career and vocabulary reads
| Topic | When I read it | Link |
|---|---|---|
| SOC onboarding plan | Before applying or interviewing | HTB |
| SOC analyst interview questions | After Weeks 2, 4, 8, and 10 | HTB |
| SOC analyst skill map | Week 1 or before CV work | HTB |
| Blue team job direction | Before role mapping | HTB |
| Weekly SOC team habits | When thinking about real SOC workflow | HTB |
| Cloud weakness context | Before cloud weeks | HTB |
| USB attack detection | Optional endpoint add-on | HTB |
| Red team tool context | Optional attacker-tool vocabulary | CrackTheLab |
Terminology Reference
The glossary is intentionally grouped so I can review only the terms related to the lab I am working on.
Investigation workflow terms
| Term | Short explanation |
|---|---|
| SOC | Security Operations Center. A team that monitors alerts, investigates suspicious events, classifies true positives and false positives, and escalates when needed. |
| DFIR | Digital Forensics and Incident Response. A discipline focused on collecting evidence, analyzing artifacts, building timelines, and handling incidents. |
| Purple Team | A learning or operational model that combines Red Team and Blue Team work: understanding what attackers do so detections and responses can improve. |
| IoC | Indicator of Compromise. A sign of compromise such as an IP address, domain, hash, file path, username, process, or registry key. |
| MITRE ATT&CK | A knowledge base for mapping attacker behavior to tactics and techniques, such as credential access, lateral movement, and exfiltration. |
| Containment | The step that stops an incident from spreading: isolate hosts, disable accounts, revoke keys, block IoCs, and preserve evidence. |
| Timeline | An ordered sequence of timestamps used to answer what happened first, which user or host was affected, and what the attacker did next. |
| Evidence stacking | Avoid relying on a single artifact. For example, to prove execution, cross-check Sysmon, Prefetch, LNK, SmartScreen, and ShimCache. |
| SIEM | A platform that collects logs and alerts, such as Splunk, Sentinel, or Elastic. It is used for searching, correlation, detection, and triage. |
| EDR | Endpoint Detection and Response. An endpoint agent that exposes process, file, network, command-line, and response data, such as host isolation actions. |
Windows forensic artifacts
| Term | Short explanation |
|---|---|
| Sysmon | A Windows telemetry tool that records process creation, network connections, DNS queries, file creation, and registry events. It is very important in DFIR. |
| Event ID | The identifier for a Windows event. For example, 4769 is related to Kerberos service tickets, and 4768 is related to AS-REQ/AS-REP activity. |
| PowerShell 4104 | The Event ID for PowerShell Script Block Logging. It is useful when an attacker runs scripts or obfuscated commands. |
| Prefetch | A Windows artifact showing that a program ran, recent execution times, and related files. It is used to help prove execution. |
| ShimCache / AppCompatCache | A Windows artifact that stores application compatibility traces. It can help prove that a file existed or was processed by the system. |
| LNK / Jump List / RecentDocs | User activity artifacts. They can show which files a user opened, which shortcuts were created, and which files appeared recently. |
| SmartScreen logs | Windows SmartScreen logs that can help prove an app or file was opened, or that a user interacted with a suspicious file. |
$MFT | The NTFS Master File Table. It contains file and folder metadata such as timestamps, paths, sizes, and records. It is powerful for file-system timelines. |
| USN Journal | The NTFS change journal. It records file changes such as create, delete, rename, and overwrite operations. It is often used to trace lateral movement or tool execution. |
| Zone.Identifier | An Alternate Data Stream showing that a file came from the Internet zone. It is useful when investigating downloaded files or phishing attachments. |
Network, C2, and Active Directory terms
| Term | Short explanation |
|---|---|
| PCAP | Packet capture. A file containing network packets for analyzing traffic, protocols, request/response flows, beaconing, C2, or exfiltration. |
| Suricata | An IDS/IPS engine that generates alerts from network traffic. In SOC labs, Suricata alerts are often the starting point for pivoting into PCAP analysis. |
| C2 | Command and Control. The channel attackers use to send commands, receive output, deploy payloads, maintain access, or exfiltrate data. |
| Beaconing | A repeated connection pattern at a regular interval. It is often used to detect C2 when a host calls out consistently. |
| DNS tunneling | A technique that hides data or commands inside DNS queries and responses to evade traditional detection. |
| DGA | Domain Generation Algorithm. Malware generates many domains to locate a C2 server, making blocklists harder to maintain. |
| LLMNR | Link-Local Multicast Name Resolution. A Windows protocol used to query hostnames on a LAN when DNS cannot resolve them. It uses UDP 5355. |
| NBT-NS | NetBIOS Name Service. An older protocol for resolving NetBIOS names on a LAN. It uses UDP 137 and is often abused alongside LLMNR. |
| NetNTLMv2 | A challenge-response hash sent by Windows during NTLM authentication. Attackers can capture it and crack it offline or relay it. |
| NTLM relay | An attack where the attacker forwards a victim’s NTLM authentication to another service to log in as the victim, often involving SMB or LDAP. |
| SMB signing | A mechanism that signs SMB messages to reduce relay risk. If it is not enforced, NTLM relay is easier to perform. |
| Kerberoasting | An attack that requests a Kerberos service ticket for an SPN account and cracks it offline to recover the service account password. |
| AS-REP roasting | An attack targeting users without Kerberos pre-authentication enabled, allowing the attacker to obtain an AS-REP and crack it offline. |
| Rubeus | A common tool for Kerberos abuse, including Kerberoasting, AS-REP roasting, and ticket manipulation. |
| PowerView | A PowerShell tool used to enumerate Active Directory users, groups, sessions, ACLs, SPNs, and trusts. |
| NTDS.dit | The Active Directory database containing domain data and password hashes. A dump of this file is a serious incident. |
| Volume Shadow Copy | A Windows snapshot mechanism. Attackers can abuse it to copy locked files such as NTDS.dit. |
| Pass-the-Hash | A lateral movement technique that uses an NTLM hash to authenticate without needing the plaintext password. |
| PsExec | A Sysinternals tool for remote execution through SMB and service creation. It is a legitimate admin tool but is often abused for lateral movement. |
| Named pipe | An IPC mechanism on Windows. Some remote execution, C2, and lateral movement tools leave named pipe artifacts. |
Cloud, web, malware, and memory terms
| Term | Short explanation |
|---|---|
| CloudTrail | AWS audit logs for API activity from the console, CLI, and SDKs. They are used to investigate IAM abuse, EC2, S3, and access key activity. |
| EC2 / S3 | EC2 is AWS compute infrastructure; S3 is object storage. Both services commonly appear in cloud incident response cases. |
| Web shell | A file or script on a web server that allows an attacker to run commands or manage the server remotely. |
| SQLite | A lightweight file-based database. It is often found in application artifacts, web artifacts, browser data, and web compromise labs. |
| PE file | A Windows executable format such as .exe or .dll. Malware triage often starts with PE metadata, strings, and imports. |
| PEStudio | A static triage tool for PE files, covering imports, strings, indicators, entropy, and suspicious metadata. |
| Ghidra | A reverse engineering tool for reading decompiled code, functions, string references, and malware logic. |
| VirusTotal | A service for looking up hashes, files, domains, and IP addresses to review detections, relations, community notes, and threat context. |
| Volatility | A memory forensics framework for analyzing RAM dumps, including processes, network connections, command lines, and injected code. |
| Chainsaw | A tool for hunting Windows Event Logs with Sigma rules or keyword logic. It is often used to quickly filter suspicious events. |
| Exfiltration | The act of moving data out of a victim environment. Evidence can appear in network traffic, cloud logs, archive files, or upload events. |
| Threat Intelligence | External context about IPs, domains, hashes, campaigns, TTPs, malware families, or actors used to enrich an investigation. |
By the end, I want clean notes, real evidence, detection ideas, containment steps, and short interview-ready explanations.